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British Cultural Studies,
Active Audiences and the Status
of Cultural Theory
An Interview with David Morley
Huimin Jin
Abstract
British cultural studies, represented perhaps chiefly by the so-called
Birmingham School, is much marked by its strong orientation towards the
application of grounded theory in the analysis of concrete cases, rather than
the development of abstract Theory with a Capital T (in Stuart Hall’s words).
As a leading figure of the Birmingham School and a key representative of the
active audience model in television studies, or broadly, media studies, David
Morley stands at a point where this trend was set, as is evidenced in this
interview. Questioned by Huimin Jin, Morley puts his audience studies into
the contexts of British cultural studies, postmodernism, Marxism, social move-
ments, and so on; and in doing so, he shows the ambiguity, and subtlety of
his concepts of how to best theorize the active audience. Only by this
method, Jin believes, could Morley launch his version of audience studies,
which aims not to invent a general theory of media effects, but to use an
interdisciplinary range of theories to explore how people actually respond to
a TV programme; and only by this approach to audience studies, further-
more, could Morley develop a theory of the audience’s activity, which is
embedded in the course of their everyday life and that cannot be thoroughly
colonized by discourses. Cultural studies, wherever it is conducted, therefore,
Morley suggests, has to construct modes of analysis that are relevant to its
own conditions of production in a particular place, at a particular time. This is
the tradition, as we know it, but also the future, as Morley envisages, of
cultural studies.
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H
UIMIN JIN (hereafter HJ): To begin with, I should say thanks for
your accepting my interview, Professor David Morley. As one of
the leading figures of British cultural studies, represented, perhaps
we could say, chiefly by the so-called Birmingham School, you should be,
I believe, in a good position to clarify some issues about which I am quite
curious, concerning the historical development of this school. More impor-
tantly, I am rather keen to know from your own perspective your special
contribution to British cultural studies, either in a Hall-centred mode or in
a broader sense.Well, my first question is about popular culture.
Recently, scholars with Manchester Metropolitan University have
shown a tendency to narrow cultural studies down to popular culture stu-
dies. By doing so, they foreground and intensify popular culture as a pri-
mary arena of cultural studies. This is related to the British tradition of
cultural studies, from Williams’s definition of culture as a way of life, via
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) subculture
researches, to the course on Popular Culture (U203) run by the Open
University from 1982 to 1987. You were invited to contribute a course unit
on ‘Interpreting Television’ for this historically significant programme. As
to the ever-expanding field of popular culture studies as an academic enter-
prise, my concern is given to such questions as why academics should take
it seriously in the British context, and if it has something specific to do
with a politics of culture, say, to the turn to Gramsci, or to, anthropologi-
cally, our everyday life, in which it has an enabling, transformative force.
David Morley (hereafter DM): I see no reason at all why cultural studies
should now concentrate exclusively on popular culture. Indeed, in my view,
it is crucial that cultural studies also attend to middle-brow and high-brow
culture, as these forms and their changing characteristics can only be under-
stood in relation to each other. At the point of cultural studies’ inception,
however, the position was very different. At that moment, it was widely
assumed that popular culture was not worthy of theorists’ attentions. So
the initial focus on popular culture was a polemical move, in a particular
context, designed to show that popular culture was a field that was indeed
well worth studying. However, nowadays, that point is generally accepted
so it doesn’t need to be stressed so much. So, to narrow cultural studies’
focus down to only popular culture would be a very regressive move in the
contemporary situation.
You’re right to point to the important shift towards perspectives
derived from anthropology as a way of understanding culture as a way of
life. But that argument doesn’t have any specific or particular relation to
the British case. It would apply, I think, to the study of culture in all socie-
ties. What is most specific to the development to cultural studies in
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Britain, in particular, relates to the moment of the late 1970s and early
1980s, the moment of the ‘Popular Culture’ course which ran at the Open
University from 1982 to 1987. That was a moment when several key factors
combined, which led to the stress on the politics of popular culture. Let
me explain.
At that point in the early 1980s, Mrs Thatcher had just been elected
and Stuart Hall and others argued that her victory was founded on a form
of populism (rather like Ernesto Laclau argues in the case of the success of
the Peronist political movement in Argentina). Hall rightly argued that
Mrs Thatcher’s victory could only be understood ^ and effectively opposed
^ on the ground of culture. His point was that she had successfully articu-
lated forms of ‘authoritarian populism’ which genuinely resonated with the
feelings and aspirations of the dissatisfied white working class of Britain.
The argument was that the core explanation for the overwhelming work-
ing-class electoral vote for her was their support for her vision of the
return to what she called ‘traditional Victorian values’. They supported her
rejection of the post-war liberal progressivism of the 1960s and 1970s.
Hall’s argument was that, if that was so, then the understanding of the cul-
tural dimension of politics, especially in the form of popular culture,
becomes critical. At the same time, a variety of dissident groups in Britain
^ women, gays, black people, disabled people, etc. ^ were also insisting
there were cultural dimensions to politics. They insisted that their oppres-
sion often took cultural forms, for instance, negative stereotypes of them in
jokes or in popular entertainment, and thus, they argued, the transforma-
tion of these forms of popular culture was an important dimension of polit-
ical struggle. That was all part of the ‘turn to Gramsci’ and that was the
reason for the corresponding stress on the cultural dimension of politics,
in which context the analysis of the dynamics of popular culture was then
seen as the key task.
The further point here is that you have to understand that this was an
argument which was made in the face of a rather hard-line, leftist,
Marxism, which said that culture was not really important at all, and attrib-
uted everything to economic factors. However, that analysis completely
misses out the extent to which Mrs Thatcher’s political success worked pre-
cisely by transforming British culture ^ and by transforming what were
understood to be British values. She had to transform those things, in
order to gain the popular support to go on and win the later political and
economic fights that she got into ^ e.g. with the miners when they went on
strike for a whole year. So her first political victory was at the level of cul-
ture: in shifting values and reasserting the sense of individualism, individ-
ual achievement, individual ambition and individual responsibility in all
spheres of life. Having won that cultural battle, she was then in a position
to win the political and economic battles.That was, in a sense, a cultural rev-
olution in Britain: she achieved a revolution in the culture of everyday life
and shifted everybody’s assumptions a long way to the Right.
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The long-run significance of this can perhaps be seen now, after the
end of the period of the ‘New Labour’ government. Despite the claim that
New Labour had a different (and supposedly radical) approach to politics,
in a very significant sense what the New Labour government did was
simply to live out its life under the hegemony of the terms of reference
established by Mrs Thatcher. I think you could very reasonably say ^ as
many people have done ^ that Tony Blair represented Mrs Thatcher’s ‘true
heir’, because the cultural battles that she won ^ about individualized
responsibility, and about the free market ^ established the hegemony of a
set of ideas which shifted the whole political terrain, and which New
Labour did little to question, for fear of losing ‘middle ground’ electoral sup-
port. Politics in the UK today is still being fought out inside the terms of
reference established by the cultural victories which Mrs Thatcher achieved.
Now the new Coalition government is pursuing that Thatcherite agenda
even more radically than New Labour ever did, in its plans to totally dis-
mantle the remnants of the welfare state set up as part of the post-Second
World War settlement in the late 1940s and thus establish a new ‘common
sense’ in which the market is taken as the hegemonic form for the modelling
of all areas of social life.
HJ: There is a popular view that your reputation in the area of cultural stu-
dies was established by your television audience researches, which are
mainly shown in your two books The ‘Nationwide’Audience (1980) and
Family Television (1986). From your empirical work, what theoretically, in
brief, have you developed or reinforced? I should say sorry if you would
think I am over-concerned with the theory per se, which may be contradic-
tory to the tradition of British cultural studies.
DM: It’s quite true that my own reputation within cultural studies was lar-
gely founded on the audience studies that I did in the 1970s and 1980s, pub-
lished as The ‘Nationwide’Audience and Family Television. However, I was
never, in fact, particularly interested in either television or audiences them-
selves, as objects of study.What I was interested in was the question of cul-
tural power. The choice to make an empirical study of television audiences
was simply a way to ‘operationalize’ a study of the extent (and limits) of ideo-
logical or cultural hegemony, as manifested in the forms of media consump-
tion. As for your further question, concerning what, theoretically, my
empirical work has achieved, my answer would be that it has produced a
far better model of the operation of media power than would have been
made possible by continuing to make abstract speculations about media
effects of the sort offered by such scholars as Adorno and Horkheimer in
the early period, by McLuhan in the 1960s, or by Baudrillard in the post-
modern version. In my view, despite the evident theoretical sophistication
of much of this work, it nonetheless still operates with what is, in the end,
a very simplistic motion of media effects. Even the latest version of ‘new
media’ theory is still flawed by the simplistic assumption, carried over
from Adorno and Horkheimer, that the media (or in this case, the ‘new’
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technologies) have automatic and unavoidable ‘effects’on people. Apart from
anything else, that is inadequate because it is, ultimately, a technologically
determinist argument. I have developed this line of critique of the severe
limitations of so-called ‘new media theory’ most fully in the section of my
last book (Morley, 2007) titled ‘Rhetorics of the Technological Sublime’ in
relation to the problems posed by the foreshortened a-historical perspective
of these theories and their oversimpli¢cation of the crude binary divide
which they draw between the ‘old’ world of the analogue media, with their
audiences of supposedly passive ‘couch potatoes’, and the marvels of the
new digital era, in which it is assumed that ‘we’ are all more signi¢cantly
active.
Clearly, my own inclination here would be to go back again to
Williams’ argument in Television, Technology and Cultural Form (2003
[1974]), which very carefully shows that technologies do not have effects
built into them, because it’s always a question of how particular technologies
come to be institutionalized in particular ways. There are many social and
cultural forces which act to determine that. As my own work has shown,
along with that of people such as the late Roger Silverstone, new technolo-
gies don’t simply have effects on people, just as media don’t have direct
effects on their audiences.The question is how particular people, in particu-
lar contexts, perceive the relevance (or irrelevance) of specific media tech-
nologies for their lives, and how they then choose to use those technologies
^ or ignore them, or indeed ‘bend’ them in some way, to a purpose for
which they were not intended.
In either case, the effects are not directly produced. If my work has
been about one thing it has been about how to develop a more satisfactory
model of the power of the media. I’m not in the business of denying the
power of the media, or denying that particular technologies allow new
things to happen. My point is to better understand how that power operates,
in conjunction with the fact that people do make choices, and do make
their own interpretations of material provided to them by the media,
whether we are talking about the mass media of broadcasting or the micro-
mobile media of today’s world.
One of the interesting points you raise in your questions is the status
of ‘Theory’, and its position within the tradition of British cultural studies.
I think it is a very interesting question and it does concern me deeply. It’s
very common in contemporary debates, especially among people whose
background is in sociology or philosophy, rather than in cultural studies,
for people to make a claim for high status by presenting themselves as
‘Theorists’. However, that is an approach which, in terms of the role of
theory in the tradition of cultural studies defined by Stuart Hall, can only
appear as extremely na|« ve. Hall’s version of cultural studies is not at all
resistant to theory as such. But that tradition, within which I’m situated, is
one in which we use theory in order to theorize some particular, empiri-
cally specific conjuncture or situation, not for the purpose of generalized
and abstracted speculation. If you look at Hall’s ‘Marx’s Notes on Method:
128 Theory, Culture & Society 28(4)
A ‘‘Reading’’ of the ‘‘1857 Introduction’’’ (1974), the point is made very
clearly there. For Hall, theory is not valued in itself, but in terms of its use-
fulness in theorizing particular conjunctures. The problematic issue about
philosophical-style ‘Theory in the Abstract’ concerns the high intellectual
price which must be paid for any moment of abstraction. Of course, theoret-
ical abstraction is a powerful, and often necessary, intellectual tool, as it
allows you to condense what would otherwise be a mountain of potentially
confusing data, in order to see the underlying patterns. But, just like a
power-saw, it is also a potentially dangerous tool, which must be used very
carefully if it is not to do more harm than good. Of course, any abstraction
or categorization is, of its nature, reductive. The question is always whether
this particular formal abstraction is worthwhile, in a specific case. Each
time you abstract, you have to ask yourself whether the benefit you will
get, in so far as the abstraction contributes to your ability to make some
ordered analysis of cultural patterns, is sufficient to make up for the fact
that, in making that abstraction, you’ll be losing track of some part of the
particularity of the situation you are trying to analyse.
Coming, as I have said, from a tradition which emphasizes specificity
in empirical investigations, I am unsympathetic to what the French philoso-
pher Michel Serres (whose approach closely parallels that of Hall) calls
lazy forms of ‘one size fits all’ theory. As Serres says, it is lamentably easy
to use that kind of theory to reduce all phenomena to one ultimate set of
‘truths’ (whether those of Marxist economics, Semiotics, Freudian psycho-
analysis or Foucauldian discourse theory). However, as he observes, a
single theoretical ‘pass key’ will never suffice to open all doors ^ rather, as
he insists, each time you want to ‘unlock’ a specific problem, you must
forge the specific theoretical key which will be adequate to the problem in
hand (Serres and Latour, 1995).
I’m interested in ‘grounded’ forms of theory. So, for example, if we
take the case of TV as a medium, I would not want to say that television
is (essentially) a thing which has some particular set of facets ^ or that it
is in the ‘essence’ of the medium, philosophically understood, that it should
always have these effects. Rather than that very deterministic and mechan-
ical mode of analysis, I’m interested in understanding how things work in
particular circumstances or contexts, when media technologies are actually
used by different people.
Of course, we must find a way to see the deep-seated (and sometimes
hidden) patterns in our data, and it is no good disavowing all generalizations
and ending up in a post-structuralist morass of just telling a million individ-
ual stories of infinite difference. But we must, nonetheless, use those gener-
alizations very cautiously and be attentive to the extent to which, every
time we make a generalization, we pay a price, in the loss of contextual spe-
cificity. The question is one of always keeping one’s eyes on the ‘price
ticket’ ^ making sure that what you lose in the use of that theoretical
abstraction is outweighed by the gains in analytical power that it enables.
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HJ:When you were developing your theory of active audiences, did you have
in mind German reception-theory such as the works of the Konstanz
School, say, Hans Herbert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser? Or, you might have
had some other theoretical resources available? It looks as if British cultural
studies concurs basically with reception-theory in assuming that audiences
are never passive receivers of media messages, or that, furthermore, the
reception or consumption of television messages can be elevated as a part
of the whole television production.
DM:Your question puts me in mind of the story that Janice Radway tells in
the introduction to the British edition of her book Reading the Romance
(1987 [1984]), which was published here some years after its initial publica-
tion in America. There, Radway explains that, when she subsequently dis-
covered British cultural studies work (including my own work on television
audiences) she was astounded to discover how closely it ‘fitted’ with the per-
spective that she, independently, had been developing in her ethnographic
work on women readers of romance fiction.
The situation was rather parallel, I think, in terms of my own relation
to the German theories to which you refer. In fact, I only came across the
work of Jauss and Iser at some point in the early 1980s, well after my
work on the ‘Nationwide’Audience had been done. What was interesting, of
course, was that, rather like Radway, I then had the experience of coming
across a body of fascinating theoretical work which was very close to what I
had been doing, even though it wasn’t directly influential in the construction
of my own perspective. This is perhaps a general point about the fact that,
if something is a good idea, it is probably going to be worked out by more
than one person, in more than one place, often simultaneously! So Jauss
and Iser and I end up not exactly in the same place but on relatively close
theoretical paths, although we got there from different routes, and by
means of different theoretical resources.
In terms of my own theoretical resources, the key ones were sociolin-
guistics and cultural anthropology. I believe I was the first person to use
the now well-worn term ‘ethnography’ in relation to media audiences, in a
paper that I wrote in 1972: ‘Reconceptualising the Media Audience:
Towards an Ethnography of Audiences’ (1974). Where did I get that from?
From the work of people like Dell Hymes and Clifford Geertz in cultural
anthropology. As for the resources used to analyse the interpretations
which people made of television programmes (which was the key main in
the ‘Nationwide’Audience study), the key elements came from debates in
the sociology of education about the role of linguistic codes in determining
children’s educational success or failure ^ which was a theory which
seemed to me to also be applicable to how the availability of different cul-
tural resources might play some part in determining patterns of decoding
TV. At that time, in Britain in the early 1970s, the key debate was between
Basil Bernstein and his critic Harold Rosen. The issue at stake was to do
with the role of class structure in the determination of language abilities
130 Theory, Culture & Society 28(4)
and language uses. Bernstein had a rather deterministic approach, which
was very important in identifying differences between working-class lan-
guage and middle-class language, much of which has very close parallels
with the work of Pierre Bourdieu in France about the social distribution of
cultural capital and cultural competences.
Conversely, while Rosen appreciated the power of those analyses, he
was very concerned that they were being conducted in too essentialist a
way. Rosen was aware that while class (or gender, or racial origin, or the
membership of any kind of social category) is very likely to have some
effect on the forms of cultural capital to which someone in a given social
position has access, this is not an automatic process. He was also concerned
with the way in which people ‘inhabit’ their membership of any particular
collectivity. In a certain sense, already in the 1970s Rosen was making
exactly the kind of argument which someone like Judith Butler makes
now, 30 years later. Just as Butler says that we are not all living in what
she calls the ‘prison house of gender’ (because there are different ways of
inhabiting the category of masculinity or femininity), Rosen is making the
same point about class: we are not just ‘prisoners’ of class ^ because there
are different ways of inhabiting middle-class or working-class identities.
The main problem with Bernstein’s model is that it just avoided this issue
entirely in its sociological determinism, assuming that the effects of class
position were more or less automatic. This is a criticism which some of us
would say also applies to the work of Bourdieu ^ which has much in
common with that of Bernstein. Thus, one could make an analogy and say
that if Bernstein was the English version of Bourdieu, his critic, Rosen,
was the equivalent of Michel de Certeau, one of Bourdieu’s most important
critics in France.
So, to go back to where I started in my answer to this question, my
main theoretical resources came from cultural anthropology, in terms of
providing a model for a ‘close reading’ of particular actions as understood
in context. They also came from sociolinguistics ^ and especially from
Volos› inov’s insistence on the ‘multi-accentuality’ of the sign, his insistence
(in contradiction of Saussure) that there is no totally shared language
system (Saussure’s ‘langue’) in a given society, and that one has to be sensi-
tive to the conflicts that are fought out in and through language and culture.
HJ: If you hold that ‘individual readings will be framed by shared cultural
formations and practices preexistent to the individual’ (Morley, 1980: 15),
though in a complex and subtle way, how could you demarcate your theory
of active, therefore resistant audiences from the Frankfurt School’s ‘non-
resistant’ conception of the masses that are passively injected with a prevail-
ing ideology? When the masses begin to decode the televisional texts, they
might have been ‘pre-mass-ed’ by some other factors, social or ideological,
which you admit as pre-existent, other than by the modern communica-
tions, television included ^ by ideology or, precisely, being part of ideologi-
cal totality or ideological apparatus: a role, whatever it may be, which you
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seem to hesitate to recognize. To be clear, my inference here is that so long
as you assert that individual interpretations are socially, at least partially,
determined, you would have already accepted that the cultural industry as
a social or ideological force or apparatus does play a role in making the
masses. This argument may be supported by the text’s role to which you
still attach importance: interpretations are not ‘arbitrary’ but ‘subject to con-
straints contained within the text itself’ (Morley, 1980: 148^9).
DM: Essentially, in The ‘Nationwide’Audience I was trying to offer what I
think is a better way of understanding media power than is offered by the
Frankfurt School’s simplistic approach to audiences ^ as passive ‘dupes’ ^
which was predominant at that time. I’m quite happy to accept that
Adorno and Horkheimer make sophisticated general arguments about the
way in which the culture industry shapes consciousness. In criticizing their
model of the automatic ‘effects’ of the media on the masses, I’m not trying
to replace it by a theory which says that all audiences are completely ‘active’
and are making just any interpretation they want out of the media materials
they come across. In that respect, my perspective is quite different from
that of scholars such as John Fiske in what has come to be called the
‘active audiences’ tradition. Contrary to them, I’m not trying to deny issues
of media power. Moreover, despite my criticisms of Bourdieu and
Bernstein’s overly deterministic model of class, I’m also very interested in
the way in which the ability of a person to re-interpret or re-use the media
to which they have access is, in fact, to some extent determined by their
social position. That’s because their social position will limit their access to
particular types of cultural codes and cultural capital. However, I’m not
advocating some model of ‘free-floating’ individuals who are just able to do
whatever they like with what the media offers to them.
Here I would also distinguish my own position from that of people
like Ulrich Beck: when Beck says that in today’s ‘individualized’ world,
class is no more than a ‘zombie’ category of little use in analysing social
life, I think he is quite wrong. Class continues to exercise profound effects
on people’s lives ^ especially in an era where, in the UK at least, rates of
inter-generational mobility are declining: so that class position at birth is
now an even better predictor of an individual’s probable life course than it
was 30 years ago. Of course, class or any other mode of social categorization
(such as gender or ethnicity) can be used in an overly deterministic ^ and
thus, ‘zombie-like’ ^ way, but that is a matter of how exactly you use the cat-
egories in your analysis, not whether or not the categories are intrinsically
useful or not.
I’m also quite prepared to accept that the socio-cultural ‘identities’
which I use in The ‘Nationwide’Audience analysis as explanations of how
this or that person interprets a particular programme are themselves
socially and culturally constructed. In English, we have this expression,
which is a kind of rhetorical figure, or joke, in which one says: ‘Which
came first, the chicken or the egg?’ In one way it is just a silly joke.
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But, at another level, it expresses a rather profound philosophical dilemma.
Of course, in a sense, it doesn’t matter which came first. What you have to
understand is what their relationship is. The same goes for the question of
the role of the culture industry in the construction of consciousness and in
the provision of the materials out of which people construct their identities,
through the decoding of TV programmes, among other things. The subse-
quent issue is how you can then look at those identities themselves as
partly explaining why this person, in this particular position, will tend to
be affected (or not affected) by this particular media, or how they will
tend to interpret some particular media programme. One has to understand
that as a dialectical process between determination and activity: to go back
to the original, as Marx says, men and women make their history, but not
in conditions of their own choice.
In the media field, what we are looking at is the way in which social
positions go some way to determining the cultural resources available to
you, the cultural choices you can make ^ out of which you construct your
identity. Now that’s not to say that you construct your identity on a ‘tabula
rasa’ in a world of completely free choices ^ that you could decide to just
be anybody, or do anything at random, or interpret the media just any way
you like ^ you couldn’t.We all have only a certain limited repertoire of pos-
sibilities available to us, and yet nonetheless, within that circumscribed rep-
ertoire there are still choices to be made, and those choices are significant.
One can’t explain the determination as total or automatic ^ to take that
view is just to wipe out the complexity of the dialectic which is at the heart
of the process.
HJ: Adapting from Frank Parkin, Stuart Hall (1973) argues that there may
be three ‘hypothetical’ positions from which a media message is decoded
by audiences: the dominant-hegemonic, the negotiated, and the oppositional,
among which the latter two, compared with the ¢rst, that rarely happens in
practice, are stressed for their frequency. It can be seen that there is a
point at which your theory of the active audience encounters this argument:
the resistance implicit in all interpretations of media texts. Here my concern
is with the questions of what makes a reading active or resistant and why
the cultural industry is not able to knead all the receivers simply into the
masses.
DM: I agree with the proposition, implicit in your question, that in a sense,
all readings are active. To make any sense at all of a TV message you first
have to interpret the dots and noise on the screen as representing images
of people, or voices and so on, and you’ve got to read the rules of perspec-
tive, through which you can reconstruct the image of a three-dimensional
world from a two-dimensional screen. Thus, activity is always present in
the interpretation of media messages. As for when an interpretation is resis-
tant, that is quite a difficult question. You could argue, for instance, that
in The ‘Nationwide’Audience, the reaction of the young black students who
dismiss ‘Nationwide’ as irrelevant to them, and who refuse, in a sense, to
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make any decoding of it at all, is far more radical a move than that of the
left-wing trade unionists in the study, who produce a classically oppositional
reading of the ‘Nationwide’ text, but who do so from within a framework
in which they recognize the programme as relevant to them.While accepting
some of the political terms in play, they make a critical counter-argument
to them, and that is a form of opposition, certainly. But you could argue
that the reaction of those who dismiss the whole genre of that kind of poli-
tics as irrelevant to them (as the young black students do) is, in another
sense, a much more radical form of negativity, and I don’t think that
Parkin’s model is able to deal with that question. That model (and the way
Hall initially takes it up) rather assumes that consciously politicized opposi-
tion is the most active, and most radical, and in that sense, the most impor-
tant form of response to the media. I’m not sure that it is the case and
that’s why, as my work developed, I begin to ‘operationalize’ the model in a
slightly different way, so as to take account of the ways in which all readings
are active (whether the dominant, negotiated or oppositional modes of
decoding), but also to take account of the fact that the forms of activity are
themselves various, in ways which Parkin’s model is not really capable of
dealing with.
HJ: Social-contextually, why did the Frankfurt School choose a passive
model of media consumers while British cultural studies chose an active
one? To put it differently, what are the social conditions that underlie this
shift of media studies, if there are any that work? In connection with this,
textually, I doubt that mass culture and popular culture are referred by
them to the same media texts and/or in the same way, even though they
might overlap. I wonder if categorically the masses is more closely associ-
ated with the producers of the cultural industry while the popular more
with consumers of the products. If it is true, can we argue that this shift
reflects a social transformation from production society to consumer society,
as Jean Baudrillard has distinguished them, and that your audience theory
is rooted in such a consumer society in which people have more choices, in
the face of a plethora of commodities?
DM: I think I’d put it rather differently! I’m not sure that you can under-
stand the Frankfurt School’s model of media power without thinking quite
specifically of the contexts of Weimar and Nazi Germany in the 1930s,
when those theories were being developed. There you have the context of
the emergence of powerful new media ^ in that case, radio and cinema ^
and new forms of political rhetoric, operating in a relation to a population
which, in its mobility from rural to urban areas, was becoming ‘anomic’
and thus more vulnerable to persuasion and propaganda. Those circum-
stances demand attention and sensitivity to questions of media power and
manipulation. That is why Adorno and Horkheimer were interested in the
particular questions that they focus on. British cultural studies certainly
arises in very different circumstances, but I’m not sure that I would inter-
pret that in the way that you seem to imply, in your question.
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As I understand your argument, you are suggesting that we face a
move from a ‘producer society’ to a ‘consumer society’, that the concept of
‘the masses’ (as mobilized in the Frankfurt School’s work) is a characteristic
of what you call a producer society ^ and that popular culture is then, con-
versely, associated with the consumer society. From that premise, if I under-
stand you rightly, you see ‘active audience theory’ as being to do with the
extent to which, in this thing called the ‘consumer society’, people have
more choices.
I think that’s a problematic form of historical periodization and one
which is characteristic of a certain type of sociological approach ^ many
social theorists love inventing new periodizations! For example, nowadays
many are people talking about Deleuze and something called ‘The control
society’, without a clear definition of what that is or when (and where) it
started! Then people speak of ‘The consumer society’: but that has various
definitions. You could talk about the consumer society of post-war Europe
in the 1950s, or you could talk about today’s emerging consumer society in
China, which seems to me to operate a in very different kind of way. Those
would, minimally, have to be understood as rather different sub-types of
the overall concept: and once you recognize that, it follows that you cannot
just assume that the same tendencies will apply in the same ways in these
different contexts.
Rather than thinking in terms of a total shift in historical periods,
from producer to consumer society, as you suggest (a shift in which power
is understood to have moved from the producers to the consumers), my
own perspective would be to say that in both situations, there always have
been ^ and still are ^ both aspects of that question. That is to say, in what
you would refer to as the ‘producer society’ of the era of mass culture,
there were still choices to be made. People still did choose between this or
that aspect of mass culture and, indeed, reacted to it, or interpreted it, in
different ways ^ so they were still active, even then. And conversely, even
now, in this so-called consumer society, where people do get to make more
choices, we mustn’t confuse choice with empowerment in any simple sense,
nor with a loss of producer power. I might have a larger number of channels
from which to choose what to watch on my television set these days, but
it’s still a menu set by someone else, within which I have to choose.
To put it another way, I’m more interested in the continuities and
crossovers between these so-called different ‘periods’ or different ‘types’ of
society than I am in just accepting such clear binary divisions unproblema-
tically. In that respect I’m influenced by Derrida’s insistence on deconstruct-
ing and destabilizing those kind of binaries ^ and by his insistence on the
need to pay attention to the ambivalences which cut across the kind of
binary divisions of which sociologists, in particular, are rather too fond of
for my liking!
HJ: Did the postmodernism, for instance, of Fredric Jameson, Michel
Foucault, Roland Barthes and Jean Baudrillard (in any other aspects,
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rather than his social periodization which you seemed to suspect) help to
shape your television studies, and in the first place, of course, your audience
studies? If so, in what ways did it work? You know, postmodern declarations
such as the death of the author, or of subjectivity, were quite provocative,
and they tend to emphasize the role of readers in the process of reception.
DM: Let me take those authors in stages. Barthes was certainly influential
for me, at an early stage, in setting up the kind of semiological model with
which I was working. But I rapidly moved towards Volos› inov’s critique of
that rather rigid form of semiology. (Here one must also note that, later in
his career, Barthes himself became sceptical of his early dream of a ‘scien-
tific semiology’!) So Barthes was influential, but perhaps Umberto Eco
more so, especially in his essay ‘Does the Audience Have Bad Effects on
Television?’ (1995 [1994]). But Volos› inov was the key resource, in producing
an analysis that was attentive to the mobility of signs; to the conflict
between signs; to what he calls the multi-accentuality of signs; and to the
way in which different people will use the same sign or word or image for
very different purposes.
As for postmodernism, the story is rather different.The simple fact is
that postmodernism came much later ^ Baudrillard, Jameson and Foucault
only came to have influence in cultural studies circles in the UK long after
I produced the ‘Nationwide’ and Family Television studies. Again, as far as
these periodizations go, just as I’m not much enamoured of the notion of
mass society, or consumer society, or production society, or control society,
likewise ‘postmodernity’ seems to me a rather weakly defined category. The
notion that ours simply ‘is’ a postmodernism era, seems problematic to me,
unless I know when it began, which in turn all depends on which definition
of modernity or modernism you are using. If there is such a thing as a post-
modern era, it’s hard to imagine that it started on the same day and exists
in the same form in Tokyo, Los Angeles or in some village in rural Uganda.
Overall, I’m more interested in the notion of how differential tempo-
ralities often coexist in any one historical moment. In this respect I’m influ-
enced by historians of the Annales School, such as Fernand Braudel, and
his ideas of differential historical time or, at a simpler level, Raymond
Williams’ notion of the coexistence of ‘emergent’ and ‘residual’ dimensions
in a culture, alongside whatever is ‘dominant’ at that particular time.
In that context, one interesting issue, it seems to me, is to do with the dif-
ferent sequences in which particular theorists are read in different cultural
contexts. What I have in mind here is how all of this might possibly seem
to you, and to a Chinese audience, reading about these things in the 21st
century, 25 years or so after I was principally involved in doing this kind
of work on TV audiences, in a quite different context.
Let me put that point another way. In a public debate at a conference,
I was once asked what the difference was between British cultural studies
and American cultural studies, and I had to come up with an instant
answer! In that setting, my answer was that it was the difference between
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Foucault read through Gramsci, and Gramsci read through Foucault. The
point is that, in Britain, people had been reading Gramsci in cultural stu-
dies, and then discovered Foucault, and began to rethink Gramsci a little
bit, in terms of what difference Foucault’s intervention made to that per-
spective. Conversely, in America, a lot of people in cultural studies came
across Foucault first and only came to Gramsci subsequently, at the
moment when British cultural studies ‘imported’ Gramsci into the USA.
So what you get in much American cultural studies is a framework that is
fundamentally Foucauldian, but which then works in a little bit of
Gramsci. My point is that this difference of sequence, in terms of theoreti-
cal influences, has considerable significance. One has to pay attention to
the modes of cultural transmission, and be sensitive to the complex routes
through which particular theories come to dominance in different circum-
stances. One mustn’t presume that which is, or was, useful or significant
at one moment in a particular place will work in the same way or have the
same significance in a different set of circumstances.
Let me give you another example. I once did some work with the late
Italian semiologist Mauro Wolf, who died a few years ago. Before his
death, he was working on a book in which he was going to translate George
Gerbner’s works on ‘cultivation analysis’ into Italian, in order to develop a
model of the long-term effects of the Italian media. What was interesting
about this was the potential significance of Gerbner’s work in Italy at that
particular moment in the very early 1990s. As far as people in the British
or American cultural studies tradition were concerned, by then, Gerbner’s
work seemed rather old fashioned ^ and very much ‘displaced’ by the work
in Italian semiotics of people like Eco. However,Wolf could see that if you
started from semiological premises, as Italian media scholars naturally did
given the strength of that tradition’s development in Italy, then importing
Gerbner into the debate at that point could prove very useful. I’m making
an elementary point about the way in which the significance of any particu-
lar theory or theorist may vary immensely according to its context in differ-
ent times and different places, and according to the very different
sequences in which intellectual life develops in particular countries.
As for the question of the ‘death of the author’, and the ‘birth of the
reader’, again, rather like what I said in relation to your counter-position of
‘producer society’ and ‘consumer society’ (and in relation to any notion that
should be understood to just move directly from the one to the other),
I don’t think that you have to ‘kill’ the author in order to give birth to the
reader! I think we still have to think about both authors and readers.
I quite agree with the polemical thrust of Barthes’ original proposition,
that we have to find a way to allow more space to the reader than was
allowed by classical literary theory. But I don’t believe that, in order to do
that, we need to get rid of the idea of authorship, not least because texts do
still have authors, even if those authors are now sometimes collective
agents (e.g. film crews) rather than solitary individuals.
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To give you a different example, there’s a wonderful moment where, in
his debate with John Searle, Derrida (an author who is often assumed to
oppose any idea of fixed textual meaning) claims his authority over his
own texts very strongly. Thus, there’s a moment in which he criticizes John
Searle for having ‘misread’ one of his texts. And Derrida says: ‘As the
author, I claim the authority to tell Searle what I meant.’ So there you
have Derrida, the doyen of deconstructionism, claiming authority by virtue
of authorship. That perhaps indicates that authors are not yet quite dead,
and indeed, they don’t need to be dead in order for readers to breathe.
HJ: Don’t you think the ways in which television programmes are struc-
tured, or rather, de-structured, are postmodern-styled? You know, in his
article ‘Cleverness is All’, which you quoted to deal with the topic of post-
modernism, M. Ignatieff finds that in television programmes narrative is
replaced by flow, connection by disconnection and sequence by randomness
(quoted in Morley, 1996: 61). Besides, as you noticed, Dick Hebdige also
points to the characteristics of such texts: ‘Popular culture o¡ers a rich ico-
nography, a set of symbols, objects and artifacts, which can be assembled
and reassembled by di¡erent groups in a literally limitless number of com-
binations’ (Hebdige, 1979: 104). My further question, then, is whether this
new kind of text, appearing ¢rst and foremost in television programmes,
was a driving force, among others, that helped to open your horizon of the
active audience.
DM: No, my analysis was developed in the mid 1970s, long before this
notion of postmodern ‘flow’, disconnection, or randomization really had
much significance in the world of the media. The media I was analysing,
both in the ‘Nationwide’ project and in the Family Television project, were
fairly conventional forms of narrative, and were characterized neither by dis-
connection or randomness. But, beyond that point, I have some conceptual
problems with the question. First, I’m not convinced by the generalization
that television (or ‘the media’) are ‘nowadays’ more disconnected and
random than they were at some earlier moment. I’m not sure how powerful
that proposition is. It may be true at a high level of abstraction, but there
really isn’t very much which is true about ‘Television in General’. So, from
my point of view, as I explained earlier, it’s difficult to contrast the ‘televi-
sion of today’ with the ‘television of yesterday’ unless you fill in at least
some of the gaps and say which television, where? Otherwise, the generaliza-
tion is so large as to hide rather more than it reveals. Indeed, one might
well argue that there has always been much more variation within television
at any given moment than there is between the television of one era and
the television of another.
Second, I don’t think that audience activity depends on disconnection;
people can be very active with very closed texts. Umberto Eco is very inter-
esting about the contradictions that one can see at play, in that situation,
in relation to the manipulation of ‘closed’ texts. I also think there is an inter-
esting question to do with historical development. In the 1970s, you get a
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very important moment when structuralist analysts criticize the traditional
forms of content analysis, insisting that you cannot understand a television
programme by simply counting the disaggregated bits, in the way that tradi-
tional content analysis does.Their argument is that a programme is a struc-
tured whole, and so you can only understand the meaning of one bit of
content in relation to the other bits with which they are combined. That
analysis, first developed in film theory was then largely taken over from
film to television studies, so then many scholars stopped doing the tradi-
tional kinds of content analysis of television, because they understood that
they needed to look holistically at the whole structure of a programme.
But then a further difficulty came with the ethnographic evidence that
gradually accumulated, showing that’s not how people watch television, espe-
cially once you have conveniences such as the automatic control device ^
with which a person can change channels without moving, by simply flick-
ing a button. What you begin to get then is a new mode of viewing, in
which people don’t necessarily sit down and watch whole TV programmes.
In fact, most people, most of the time, only consume bits of different televi-
sion programmes ^ they might go out to do something else in the middle,
they might change programmes and watch something else and then come
back later to the one they started with. At that point, the structuralist cri-
tique of content analysis loses its force. One has to recognize that, in so far
as viewing modes are increasingly fragmented, it might be the case that
the kind of ‘cumulative effects’of media patterns of images and statements,
of the type researched by Gerbner, might have more relevance than the
structuralist critics of the 1970s have supposed, precisely because that cri-
tique was premised on the audience displaying a mode of focused attention
on the complete, single text. That premise may be feasible if your object of
study is film, shown in special places called cinemas ^ but it is not feasible
when applied to the study, for instance, of domestic television, where the cir-
cumstances generally dictate a rather different, more distracted, mode of
consumption. However, one still has to allow for certain exceptions. There
are moments, even in contemporary conditions of domestic consumption,
in which someone might well sit down and watch a whole text ^ e.g. of
their ‘favourite’ programme. Conversely, there may be occasions in which
someone goes to the cinema and, for whatever reason, doesn’t concentrate
on the film all the way through.You can’t presume a one to one relationship
between a particular architecture of display and a particular mode of con-
sumption. Nor can you presume that there is only one mode of consumption
for one particular medium. One can realistically, and usefully, only research
the identifiable patterns of consumption of different media in different con-
texts, and one must always be sensitive to variations of the sorts I have
indicated.
HJ: In the field of popular culture studies, how has British cultural studies
responded to French post-structuralism or, broadly, to postmodernism?
Would you please give me an overview of their interactions or contestations
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in interpreting popular culture? It seems to me that British cultural studies
has never given up its modernist perspective by which popular culture is
not depthless, superficial and then meaningless as Fredric Jameson claims,
but a site of ideological struggles, negotiations, concessions, compromises,
or in short, of exactly that meaningfulness.
DM: My own position is that, interesting and stimulating as both Jameson
and Baudrillard can be, there is something fundamentally elitist about the
contempt in which they both hold popular culture and, thus, about the con-
tempt in which they implicitly also hold the majority of the people who are
engaged with popular culture. To dismiss this whole field as depthless,
superficial and meaningless, as they do, seems to me an act of the most
stunning arrogance and that is definitely not a direction which I’d want to
follow. I notice that, in a previous question, you referred approvingly to
the work of Hebdige. I think that, by contrast to people like Jameson and
Baudrillard, he is an elegant example of someone who would never make
the mistake of dismissing popular culture as either depthless, superficial
or meaningless. Rather like Hebdige, my concern is to understand the
forms and modalities of popular culture, but, in doing so, I take very seri-
ously the meanings at stake for its participants. To go back to one of my
answers to an earlier question, I think it would be impossible to understand
the rise of Thatcherism in Britain without understanding how that battle
was fought out on the field of popular culture. I don’t think that was in the
slightest bit ‘meaningless’. I do also think there was a difference between
what one could see ‘on the surface’ and the hidden significances that one
could read, at a deeper level, from the visible, ‘symptomatic’ events. Some
of the things that might have seemed rather superficial, in fact, turned out
to be of huge cultural, economic and political significance, and it was only
by studying these seemingly trivial shifts in popular culture very carefully
that it was possible to establish what was happening in British culture and
politics in that period. The same would follow now: one needs to analyse
the contemporary developments of popular culture with the same degree of
seriousness ^ a theoretical point which goes back, beyond Stuart Hall, to
Richard Hoggart’s early work on popular culture in the UK in the 1950s.
HJ: There is a view which says that the good days of British cultural studies
are now long past. It might be true to the extent that Stuart Hall has been
retired for years and the CCCS has been closed, and that, what is more crit-
ical, there have been few new themes and core figures emerging that gener-
ate as much interest as broadly as before. However, from another point of
view, after these changes it is time for us to redefine, with some critical
reflections, British cultural studies or cultural studies. There are many
other centres for cultural studies both in and outside Britain, that is, cul-
tural studies becomes increasingly international. Concerning the new con-
text, I am quite interested in questions such as how British cultural
studies is going on in Britain, in what way you and your colleagues continue
British cultural studies, how we can promote cultural studies in a global
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sense, and last, back to our main topic in this interview, how you think
about popular culture that crosses boundaries: popular culture is always
not only domestically but also globally popular.
DM: Clearly, this is a very difficult and important issue. The story of the
influence, internationally, of British cultural studies, is perhaps best under-
stood as a kind of ‘export industry’ through which a particular set of per-
spectives, initially developed in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, addressing
the specific problems of British society, were gradually exported to the
English-speaking territories of the previous British empire, most notably
Australia, Canada and then, at a later point, to America. Manifestly,
British cultural studies was designed to analyse the situation of a particular
country at a particular time. Of course, there are certain theoretical and
analytical positions built into it which can be abstracted and transported to
different circumstances, allowing for the relevant variations and distinctions
that need to be made. However, the idea that British cultural studies can
usefully be exported as a kind of ‘ready-made’ template, according to
which the whole world can be understood, is clearly nonsensical: that
would just be another form of cultural imperialism, this time in the intellec-
tual sphere. Cultural studies, wherever it is conducted, has to construct
modes of analysis which are relevant to its own conditions of production in
a particular place, at a particular time.
For instance, it may well be that someone trying to develop a cultural
studies perspective in China now, as I understand you are doing, can hope
to learn certain things from the history of the development of cultural stu-
dies in Britain, or elsewhere. But you have to approach those previous intel-
lectual traditions, located elsewhere, with a strong element of critical
intelligence, and you have to think carefully about in what ways, given the
many differences between British and Chinese society, you would need to
transpose the modes of analysis developed in Britain in order for them to
be of any use at all in China. So again, that takes us back to the contextual
specificity of cultural studies.
One also has to be attentive to the way in which the world around us
has changed significantly since the 1970s when my own audience work was
actually conducted. The model of cultural studies that we developed in
Britain then was one which was premised on the notion of a national society.
We were primarily concerned with class, race and gender differences
within Britain, and with the British media. Certainly, those still remain
very important problems but nowadays, communications is simply not
national in the way that it was in the 1970s. We now have transnational
broadcast systems, and satellite systems of communication, which mean
that messages are mobile, all over the place. Cultures are no longer simply
national. That is the force of Appadurai’s argument about ‘difference and
disjuncture’ (1996: 27¡.) in the global economy, when he talks about how
the ‘mediascapes’ of the contemporary world now exceed national bound-
aries. He also talks there about how the ‘ethnoscapes’ of our contemporary
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situation also now transcend national boundaries, in so far as we live in a sit-
uation in which not only are messages mobile across boundaries, but so too
are audiences. In a world of increased migrancy, we are now in a situation,
as he says, where ‘moving messages meet deterritorialized viewers’ (1996: 4).
Now, clearly, that is a very different situation from the one that we
faced in Birmingham in 1972, when I began my studies of audiences ^ and
we have to allow for those differences in any contemporary analysis that
we want to make. At the same time, to go back to what I said before about
my anxiety about clearly ‘binarized’ divisions and periodizations, I don’t
want to suggest that the age of the nation-state or ‘the national era’ is com-
pletely over ^ or that we now all live in some ‘transnational’ period, in
which we are all equally mobile and all attending to messages which come
to us from far away. That’s simply not the case. Some people, in some
places, are much more transnational than others, and many still effectively
live out their lives within national ^ and even more local ^ boundaries.
That was the problem that I explored in my book Home Territories (2000),
which was focused on questions of mobility and the media, but was also
insistent on continuing to pay attention to the ways in which boundaries of
a local, regional or national kind, are still, in many ways, enforced today.
Indeed, it would seem to me that in China, in particular, the nation-state
is not only ‘still alive’ but is both thriving and powerful, if in different
ways than within the nations of Europe.
In ending, let me say again that we clearly cannot take any mode of
analysis, be it British cultural studies or anything else, and imagine that it
will automatically help us understand the situation in another culture at a
different time, without making all manner of cultural translations and
transpositions. However, on the other hand, we have no need to imagine
that we live in some totally ‘new’ world, where all previous theories are
now redundant. As people like Carolyn Marvin (1990 [1988]) have shown
us, all technologies, all media, were new in their own time: the telegraph,
the cinema, the radio, the television, the video game, the computer (cf.
Morley, 2007: 243). There is always a moral panic about the latest ‘new’
medium and its supposed ‘e¡ects’, and many of the problems we face today
have clear historical precedents which we need to consider. I think that we
have to develop a much more serious historical and comparative set of per-
spectives within cultural studies. And I hope that you and your colleagues
in China will ¢nd some parts of what I have to say in this interview of use
to you in your project of trying to do that! Thank you.
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